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6 Marketing Tips For Crypto Start-Ups

6 Marketing Tips For Crypto Start-Ups
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With over 1500 cryptocurrencies on the market at the moment, it might feel like cryptos have finally made it into the mainstream. And while this may well be true to Bitcoin, it’s important to remember that they’re still considered a niche interest amongst the majority of internet users.
If you’re a crypto start-up that is truly looking to engage audiences across the internet, you have to put hard work into your marketing. Generating a public face that satisfies the experts but still engaged new users is difficult, but here are a few tips that can help you along your way.
Explain the basics
Cryptocurrencies may not be a new thing for you, but it is to most readers. Don’t assume your audience has the same technical knowledge that you’ve developed working with cryptos in detail, be prepared to explain the basics in simple language. Define your core concepts, use metaphors and analogies and take time to explain processes rather than relying on jargon.
“Where possible, use visuals to explain your concepts,” recommends Ruth Langmore, a web developer at Britstudent and NextCoursework. “Audiences are much more receptive to video explanations than verbal ones, so think about making an explainer video to market your product.”
Start with a problem
There’s a tendency with start-ups to fall in love with a concept without knowing why it’s useful. The result is you search around for a problem that your solution fits, rather than finding an existing problem and developing a purpose-built solution.
Instead, throughout your development and marketing process, ask yourself what precise problem your company is setting out to fix. This is, in effect, your vision, and your crypto is the mission that will help you achieve it.
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Original post By Clark April 28, 2020 BTC Wired
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Bitcoin-development Digest, Vol 45, Issue 37 | Joshua | Feb 11 2015

Joshua on Feb 11 2015:
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Today's Topics:
  1. Re: Proposal for P2P Wireless (Bluetooth LE) transfer of
    Payment URI (Eric Voskuil)
  2. Proposal: Requiring a miner's signature in the block header
    (Hector Chu)
  3. Re: Proposal: Requiring a miner's signature in the block
    header (Natanael)
Message: 1
Date: Tue, 10 Feb 2015 09:56:39 -0800
From: Eric Voskuil <eric at voskuil.org>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal for P2P Wireless
 (Bluetooth LE) transfer of Payment URI 
To: M?rtin H?bo??tiak <martin.habovstiak at gmail.com>
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net>, Paul Puey
 <[paul at airbitz.co](https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev)> 
Message-ID: <54DA4657.5080604 at voskuil.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
On 02/10/2015 09:16 AM, M?rtin H?bo??tiak wrote:
I'm not sure if I was clear enough. Handshake should be used to
establish authenticated AND encrypted communication using ECDH (or
just DH, but I think it's easier to use ECDH, since required functions
are already used in Bitcoin protocol), like RedPhone does. BTW
knowledge of verification string is useless to the attacker.
Yes, I think this was clear from your description.
Yes, the customer must verify it verbally and the merchant shouldn't
send the transaction before verification. Other possibility is that in
case of differing verification strings new address is generated, so
attacker doesn't know the address. But in this case, amount is leaked
and there is quite high probability it can be found in the Blockchain.
Yes, for each handshake the payment request would need to contain a
different address, mitigating some of the privacy loss.
Anyway, I don't believe the transaction can be made securely without
such interaction except with white-listing public keys, so I see no
reason why interaction should be problematic.
It can be done securely and privately by transfer of a shared secret
through a private channel.
We don't have such strict regulations but I agree that security is
important. Currently I think that verbal verification and manual
confirmation is the best way to achieve high security and reasonable
user-friendliness.
I think for a broadcast model (e.g. Bluetooth only) that is the only
want to ensure integrity and privacy. A narrow cast can use proximity to
establish trust.
2015-02-10 17:55 GMT+01:00 Eric Voskuil <eric at voskuil.org>:
Martin,
I like your idea for the commit protocol in that it resolves the
vandalous address substitution attack. However, I don't see a way to
prevent privacy loss without adverse impact to the scenario.
Anyone could perform the handshake and thereby obtain the payment
request. Therefore to prevent inadvertent disclosure the customer must
visually confirm the "phrase" and then verbally tell the merchant to
proceed by sending the payment request.
One might argue that it's sufficient to preserve the integrity of the
transaction while suffering the privacy loss, especially given that a
hijacked handshake should never result in a completed transaction -
unless of course the hijacker pays.
But imagine someone purchasing their meds. HIPAA requires the checkout
queue to form behind a yellow line. That speaks directly to this
question.
e
On 02/06/2015 01:07 AM, M?rtin H?bo??tiak wrote:
2015-02-06 2:29 GMT+01:00 Eric Voskuil <eric at voskuil.org>:
On 02/05/2015 04:36 PM, Martin Habov?tiak wrote:
I believe, we are still talking about transactions of physical
people in physical world. So yes, it's proximity based - people
tell the words by mouth. :)
Notice from my original comment:
A MITM can substitute the key. If you don't have verifiable
identity associated with the public key (PKI/WoT), you need
a shared secret (such as a secret phrase).
I said this could only be accomplished using a shared secret or a
trusted public key. Exchanging a value that is derived from a pair of
public keys is a distinction without a difference. The problem remains
that the parties must have a secure/out-of-band channel for
communicating this value.
The fact that they are face-to-face establishes this channel, but that
brings us back to the original problem, as it requires manual
verification - as in visual/audible scanning of the two values for
comparison. At that point the visual comparison of the address, or
some
value derived from it, is simpler.
I have never been against manual verification. What I'm trying to say
is let's just make manual verification easier and more secure.
Comparison of address is simpler for the coder but also simpler to
attack. It has these problems:
  • Addresses broadcasted in plaintext (privacy issue)
  • Amounts broadcasted in plaintext (privacy issue)
  • Address is long - takes lot of time to verify (user experience issue)
  • Address prefix can be brute-forced, if too short or used to make
"black hole" address if longer (vandalism issue)
Commit protocol can be used for both the encryption and the
authentication while user experience is not bad and everything is
still secure.
In case of RedPhone, you read those words verbally over not-yet-
verified channel relying on difficulty of spoofing your voice. Also
the app remembers the public keys, so you don't need to verify
second time.
This is reasonable, but wouldn't help in the case of an ad-hoc
connection between parties who don't know each other well.
I suggest you to try RedPhone (called Signal on iPhone) yourself.
It's free/open source, Internet-based and end-to-end encrypted. You
may find it useful some day. Also I'm willing to help you with
trying it after I wake up. (~8 hours: Send me private e-mail if
you want to.)
I appreciate the offer. I really don't trust any smartphone as a
platform for secure communication/data. But encrypting on the wire
does
of course shrink the attack surface and increase the attacker's cost.
e
D?a 6. febru?ra 2015 1:22:23 CET pou??vate? Eric Voskuil
<eric at voskuil.org> nap?sal:
On 02/05/2015 04:04 PM, M?rtin H?bo??tiak wrote:
That's exactly what I though when seeing the RedPhone code, but
after
I studied the commit protocol I realized it's actually secure and
convenient way to do it. You should do that too. :)
I was analyzing the model as you described it to me. A formal
analysis
of the security model of a particular implementation, based on
inference
from source code, is a bit beyond what I signed up for. But I'm
perfectly willing to comment on your description of the model if you
are
willing to indulge me.
Shortly, how it works:
The initiator of the connection sends commit message containing the
hash of his temporary public ECDH part, second party sends back
their
public ECDH part and then initiator sends his public ECDH part in
open. All three messages are hashed together and the first two
bytes
are used to select two words from a shared dictionary which are
displayed on the screen of both the initiator and the second party.
The parties communicate those two words and verify they match.
How do they compare words if they haven't yet established a secure
channel?
If an attacker wants to do MITM, he has a chance of choosing right
public parts 1:65536. There is no way to brute-force it, since that
would be noticed immediately. If instead of two words based on the
first two bytes, four words from BIP39 wordlist were chosen, it
would
provide entropy of 44 bits which I believe should be enough even
for
paranoid people.
How this would work in Bitcoin payment scenario: user's phone
broadcasts his name, merchant inputs amount and selects the name
from
the list, commit message is sent (and then the remaining two
messages), merchant spells four words he sees on the screen and
buyer
confirms transaction after verifying that words match.
So the assumption is that there exists a secure (as in
proximity-based)
communication channel?
e
2015-02-06 0:46 GMT+01:00 Eric Voskuil <eric at voskuil.org>:
On 02/05/2015 03:36 PM, M?rtin H?bo??tiak wrote:
A BIP-70 signed payment request in the initial broadcast can
resolve the
integrity issues, but because of the public nature of the
broadcast
coupled with strong public identity, the privacy compromise is
much
worse. Now transactions are cryptographically tainted.
This is also the problem with BIP-70 over the web. TLS and other
security precautions aside, an interloper on the communication,
desktop,
datacenter, etc., can capture payment requests and strongly
correlate
transactions to identities in an automated manner. The payment
request
must be kept private between the parties, and that's hard to do.
What about using encryption with forward secrecy? Merchant would
generate signed request containing public ECDH part, buyer would
send
back transaction encrypted with ECDH and his public ECDH part. If
receiving address/amount is meant to be private, use commit
protocol
(see ZRTP/RedPhone) and short authentication phrase (which is
hard
to
spoof thanks to commit protocol - see RedPhone)?
Hi Martin,
The problem is that you need to verify the ownership of the public
key.
A MITM can substitute the key. If you don't have verifiable
identity
associated with the public key (PKI/WoT), you need a shared secret
(such
as a secret phrase). But the problem is then establishing that
secret
over a public channel.
You can bootstrap a private session over the untrusted network
using
a
trusted public key (PKI/WoT). But the presumption is that you are
already doing this over the web (using TLS). That process is
subject
to
attack at the CA. WoT is not subject to a CA attack, because it's
decentralized. But it's also not sufficiently deployed for some
scenarios.
e
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Message: 2
Date: Wed, 11 Feb 2015 08:54:15 +0000
From: Hector Chu <hectorchu at gmail.com>
Subject: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal: Requiring a miner's signature
 in the block header 
To: bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
Message-ID:
 < 
CAAO2FKEFxC_byt4xVJb0S-7yy0M7M-Av7MHUH-RBDuri_GAFtw at mail.gmail.com>
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A proposal for stemming the tide of mining centralisation -- Requiring a
miner's signature in the block header (the whole of which is hashed), and
paying out coinbase to the miner's public key.
Please comment on whether this idea is feasible, has been thought of
before,
etc., etc. Thank you.
Motivation
Mining is centralising to a handful of pool operators. This is bad for a
number of political reasons, which we won't go into right now. But I have
always believed that some years down the line, they could hold the users
hostage and change the rules to suit themselves. For instance by
eliminating
the halving of the block reward.
Solution
Currently the block header is formed by the pool operator and distributed
for
hashing by the pooled miners. It is possible to divide the work among the
miners as the only thing that is used to search the hash space is by
changing
a nonce or two.
I propose that we require each miner to sign the block header prior to
hashing. The signature will be included in the data that is hashed.
Further,
the coinbase for the block must only pay out to the public key counterpart
of
the private key used to sign the block header.
A valid block will therefore have a signature in the block header that is
verified by the public key being paid by the coinbase transaction.
Ramifications
Work can no longer be divided among the pooled miners as before, without
sharing the pool's private key amongst all of them. If the pool does try to
take this route, then any of the miners may redeem the coinbase when it
matures. Therefore, all miners will use their own key pair.
This will make it difficult to form a cooperating pool of miners who may
not
trust each other, as the block rewards will be controlled by disparate
parties
and not by the pool operator. Only a tight clique of trusted miners would
be
able to form their own private pool in such an environment.
Attacks
Pooled hashpower, instead of earning bitcoins legitimately may try to break
the system instead. They may try a double-spending attack, but in order to
leverage the pool to its full potential the pool operator would again have
to
share their private key with the whole pool. Due to the increased
cooperation
and coordination required for an attack, the probability of a 51% attack is
much reduced.
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Message: 3
Date: Wed, 11 Feb 2015 10:25:27 +0100
From: Natanael <natanael.l at gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal: Requiring a miner's
 signature in the block header 
To: Hector Chu <hectorchu at gmail.com>
Cc: bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
Message-ID:
  Ref9mN7bJLg-odep3m5teZ7JWDLC+zknQdQQ at mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Den 11 feb 2015 09:55 skrev "Hector Chu" <hectorchu at gmail.com>:
A proposal for stemming the tide of mining centralisation -- Requiring a
miner's signature in the block header (the whole of which is hashed), and
paying out coinbase to the miner's public key.
Please comment on whether this idea is feasible, has been thought of
before,
etc., etc. Thank you.
Motivation
Mining is centralising to a handful of pool operators. This is bad for a
number of political reasons, which we won't go into right now. But I have
always believed that some years down the line, they could hold the users
hostage and change the rules to suit themselves. For instance by
eliminating
the halving of the block reward.
[...]
I propose that we require each miner to sign the block header prior to
hashing. The signature will be included in the data that is hashed.
Further,
the coinbase for the block must only pay out to the public key
counterpart of
the private key used to sign the block header.
[...]
This will make it difficult to form a cooperating pool of miners who may
not
trust each other, as the block rewards will be controlled by disparate
parties
and not by the pool operator. Only a tight clique of trusted miners would
be
able to form their own private pool in such an environment.
People already trust things like cloud mining, so your solution with
increasing technical trust requirements won't help. But you will however
break P2Pool instead.
Also, note that threshold signatures (group signatures) could probably be
used by an actual distrusting pool's miners. There are already a proof of
concept for this implemented with secp256k1 that works with Bitcoin clients
silently. This wouldn't prevent such a pool from working.
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Blockchain Virtualization: The Next Evolution of Decentralised Infrastructures - Oded Noam (Orbs)

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